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TEN ANGRY MEN: UNANIMOUS JURY 
VERDICTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS AND 





Any American who has watched a legal drama on television or in film 
would assume that a criminal conviction can occur only if a jury of twelve 
persons votes unanimously.
1
  But, as with most assumptions about the legal 
world, this one is incorrect; it is wholly constitutional for an accused to be 
convicted of a crime without twelve guilty votes.
2
  In criminal trials, the 
Constitution requires neither that the jury be comprised of twelve persons
3
 




* Candidate for Juris Doctor and LL.M. in International Human Rights, Northwestern 
University School of Law, May 2013; M.A., Queen’s University Belfast, 2008; B.S.F.S., 
Georgetown University, 2007.  Thank you to Al Alschuler, Shari Diamond, and Will Singer 
for your valuable contributions and considerable assistance.  I would also like to thank my 
family and friends, particularly Evan Elsner, Ashley Burns, Emma Jones, and Katie Pulaski 
for always providing much-needed distractions. 
1 See, e.g., TWELVE ANGRY MEN (Metro Goldwyn Mayer 1957) (“However you decide, 
your verdict must be unanimous.”). 
2 Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). 
3 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
4 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 404.  Apodaca’s sister case, Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 
(1972), was decided at the same time.  Petitioners challenged Louisiana’s majority-verdict 
law, which allowed for a conviction on a nine-to-three vote.  (Louisiana has since changed 
that law to allow for a ten-to-two conviction.  LA. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 782 (2005).) 
Moreover, the case in Johnson was tried before the announcement of Duncan v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968), which incorporated the Sixth Amendment’s right to trial to the 
states, and therefore, “unlike Apodaca v. Oregon, decided today, the Sixth Amendment’s 
guarantee of a trial by jury is not applicable here.”  Johnson, 406 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting).  While this Comment is focused on Apodaca, the Johnson opinion is treated as 
an extension of Apodaca, and portions of the Johnson opinion may be used in a discussion of 
Apodaca.  Although technically they are different opinions—Johnson centered on whether 
unanimity is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law and 
Apodaca centered on whether unanimity is a violation of the Sixth Amendment’s right to 
trial—functionally, and for the purposes of this discussion, they are treated as one and the 
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Williams v. Florida (upholding the constitutionality of six-person 
juries) and Apodaca v. Oregon (upholding the constitutionality of non-
unanimous majority verdicts in criminal trials) can be easily reconciled with 
one another, as they both concern common-law requirements for criminal 
trials upon which the Constitution is silent.  But the application of these two 
holdings is far more problematic.  Williams, which considered the 
constitutionality of Florida’s six-person criminal juries, held that neither 
federal nor state trials need to utilize a twelve-person jury.
5
  However, 
Apodaca upheld the constitutionality of non-unanimous majority verdicts 
only in state criminal trials.
6
  In federal criminal trials, the Supreme Court 
has found that the verdict must be unanimous.
7
  Apodaca’s holding, the 
product of an odd split among the Justices, is the reason why there are at 
present two jurisdictions in the United States where a defendant can be 




Apodaca remains good law, and that fact is problematic for three 
reasons.  The first and timeliest reason is that the Court set forth an 
incorporation standard in McDonald v. City of Chicago that directly 
undermines the current two-track approach to unanimity in criminal trials.
9
  
Secondly, allowing majority verdicts in criminal trials seriously weakens 
the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.
10
  And finally, empirical research 
has since disproven the assumptions about jury behavior upon which the 
plurality in Apodaca relied.
11
 
This is not a purely academic debate.  The Apodaca decision not only 
affects Louisiana and Oregon; similar legislation has been proposed in other 
states that would allow for majority verdicts in criminal trials in attempts to 
 
same (particularly as the lengthy dissents and concurrences are found in Johnson rather than 
in Apodaca). 
5 Williams, 399 U.S. at 86. 
6 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 410–11. 
7 Johnson, 406 U.S. at 369–77 (Powell, J., concurring). 
8 OR. REV. STAT. § 136.450 (2009); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 782 (2010).  In 
1972, Louisiana required only nine votes, but in 1974 the Louisiana legislature amended the 
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure such that ten votes are now necessary for a 
conviction.  1975 La. Acts 1st Ex. Sess. 81, 82. 
9 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (holding that the Second Amendment was fully 
incorporated and thus it is unconstitutional for a state or local government to deprive citizens 
of the right to bear arms). 
10 See infra Part III.B. 
11 See infra Part III.C. 
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be “tough on crime.”
12
  State representatives from both California and 
Colorado have introduced bills in their respective legislatures that would 
allow for majority verdicts in criminal cases.
13
  More recently, in 2003, the 
New York State Assembly considered a majority-verdict proposal couched 
as an anti-crime initiative aiming to “produce more convictions and put 
more criminals behind bars.”
14
  The bill’s sponsors claimed that the 
unanimity requirement resulted in a “higher crime rate” and “disrespect for 
the law.”
15
  As of yet, these proposals have failed and no state (besides 
Oregon and Louisiana) has adopted a majority-verdict provision for 
criminal trials.
16
  But in some states majority-verdict proposals are 
introduced fairly frequently, as there is obvious and powerful political 
capital to be gained from increasing conviction rates, regardless of the 
means by which one does so.
17 
Defendants in Oregon and Louisiana continue to object to their state’s 
practices.  Scott Bowen was accused in Oregon of multiple felony sex 
offenses, including first-degree rape, alleged to have occurred between 
1991 and 2000.
18
  During his trial, he requested a jury instruction that the 
verdict shall be unanimous.
19
  His request was denied and he was convicted 
by a vote of ten to two; “[i]n forty-eight states, the jurors would have been 
required to continue deliberating toward consensus . . . .  But because this 
case arose in Oregon, petitioner stands convicted.”
20
  The Supreme Court 
 
12 One scholar notes that, at the federal level, the two major parties “have participated in 
a kind of bidding war to see who can appropriate the label ‘tough on crime’” through their 
frequent enactment of tougher sentences and more criminal prohibitions.  William J. Stuntz, 
The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 509 (2001).  While 
Stuntz focuses his discussion on federal criminal law, his observation that “appealing to the 
median voter is more likely to mean some combination of two things: generating outcomes 
(not rules) the median voter wants, and taking symbolic stands the median voter finds 
attractive” is equally applicable to political pressures at the state level.  Id. at 530. 
13 Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1261, 
1266 (2000). 
14 Matthew Tulchin, Note, An Analysis of the Development of the Jury’s Role in a New 
York Criminal Trial, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 425, 425–26 (2005) (citing Assemb. 4469, 226th Leg. 
Sess. (N.Y. 2003)). 
15 Id. at 483. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 482 n.310. 
18 State v. Bowen, 185 P.3d 1129, 1130 (Or. Ct. App. 2008). 
19 State v. Bowen, 168 P.3d 1208, 1208 (Or. Ct. App. 2007). 
20 Reply Brief for Petitioner on Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Bowen v. Oregon, 130 
S. Ct. 52 (2009) (No. 08-1117). 
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denied cert in 2009.
21 
More recently, Alonso Herrera was convicted on a ten-to-two vote of 
unauthorized use of a vehicle.
22
  Again, the defendant requested a jury 
instruction asking that the verdict be unanimous.
23
  This request was denied, 
the Oregon Supreme Court denied review, and a writ of certiorari was 
submitted to the Supreme Court.
24
  On January 10, 2011, the Court denied 
cert.
25
  Far from being merely an interesting footnote about criminal 
procedure, the Apodaca decision has had grave repercussions for accused 
defendants in Oregon and Louisiana. 
This Comment argues that the constitutionality of majority verdicts in 
state criminal trials needs to be reexamined, and overturned, in light of 
recent Supreme Court decisions and empirical studies.  Part II will include 
(a) a brief history of the incorporation doctrine in general and the 
incorporation of the Sixth Amendment in particular, and (b) an in-depth 
examination of the reasoning of the Apodaca holding.  Part III will argue 
that the reasoning in Apodaca, disjointed in 1972, has lost all force in the 
thirty years since it was decided for three reasons.  Firstly, unanimity in 
criminal trials satisfies the standard for incorporation the Court set forth in 
McDonald in July 2010.  Secondly, majority verdicts in criminal trials 
implicate serious due process concerns given their weakened adherence to 
the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.  And finally, the Apodaca 
plurality’s assumptions about jury behavior, which formed the bulk of its 
analysis, have since been proved false in empirical studies.  Those studies 
have shown that majority-verdict juries deliberate less robustly and tend to 
discount the opinions of women and minorities; furthermore, concerns 
about the prevalence of hung juries are overblown.  In short, the pillars 
upon which the Apodaca holding rested have crumbled since it was 
decided. 
II. INCORPORATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
Originally, the Bill of Rights only applied to the federal government, 
 
21 Bowen v. Oregon, 130 S. Ct. 52 (2009). 
22 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, State v. Herrera, 131 S. Ct. 904 (Jan. 10, 2011) 
(No. 10-344). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 1. 
25 Eugene Volokh, Supreme Court Declines to Reconsider Constitutionality of 
Convictions by Non-Unanimous Juries, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 10, 2011, 11:38 
AM), http://volokh.com/2011/01/10/supreme-court-declines-to-reconsider-constitutionality-
of-convictions-by-non-unanimous-juries/. 
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and not the states.
26
  However, starting with the Slaughter-House Cases in 
1873, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment at least 
partially extended the Bill of Rights to the states as well.
27
  In the first half 
of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court applied a doctrine known as 
“selective incorporation” to determine which provisions of the Bill of 




To decide the reach of incorporation in Palko v. Connecticut, the Court 
used a standard of whether or not a particular right was “implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty.”
29
  In that case the Court determined that the 
Fifth Amendment’s protection against double jeopardy did not qualify as 
such.
30
  Even though this holding was later overturned in Benton v. 
Maryland twenty-two years later,
31
 the Palko standard remains one of the 
most famous formulations of the incorporation doctrine.
32
  According to 
Gideon v. Wainwright, “a provision which is ‘fundamental and essential to 
a fair trial’ is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”
33
  The past fifty years have widened the scope of those 
provisions that necessitate incorporation, particularly in regards to personal 
(as opposed to economic) liberties.
34
  In fact, as of 2011, the only rights not 
fully incorporated—besides the Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury 
verdict—are the Third Amendment’s protection against the quartering of 
soldiers, the Fifth Amendment’s requirement of a grand jury indictment, the 
Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury in civil cases, and the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines.
35
 
Most recently, the Court reaffirmed its adherence to an incorporation 
standard of “whether a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental to 
our scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice” in McDonald v. City of 
 
26 See, e.g., Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250–51 (1833) (holding that the 
Fifth Amendment applies only to the federal government). 
27 The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
28 For a discussion of the incorporation doctrine, see 2 LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. 
WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING AMERICA, 67–87 (2005). 
29 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
30 Id. at 329. 
31 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
32 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3032 (2010). 
33 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 
455, 465 (1942)).  Gideon expressly overturned Betts and incorporated the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel for criminal defendants. 
34 See EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 28. 
35 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035 n.13. 




  McDonald, which extended the Second Amendment’s 
prohibition on infringing the “right of the people to keep and bear arms”
37
 
to the states, reiterated that the Court has “abandoned ‘the notion that the 
Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a watered-down, 
subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights,’” and 
that it is “‘incongruous’ to apply different standards ‘depending on whether 
the claim was asserted in a state or federal court.’”
38
  Despite the fact that 
the incorporation doctrine has widened so that nearly every right guaranteed 
by the Bill of Rights applies equally to state and federal governments, the 
constitutional right to a unanimous verdict in a criminal trial applies 
exclusively to the federal courts. 
A. INCORPORATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
The Sixth Amendment has not been fully incorporated; however, most 
of its provisions have been incorporated piecemeal.
39
  The Amendment 
reads as follows: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
40
 
In addition to the rights mentioned in the text, the Sixth Amendment 
also guarantees other fundamental aspects of criminal trials, including the 
reasonable-doubt requirement and a jury of at least six members.
41
  Because 
these rights are “fundamental and essential to a fair trial” they are binding 
upon the states, even though the Sixth and Seventh Amendments do not 
 
36 Id. at 3034 (emphasis omitted). 
37 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
38 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1964)). 
39 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (incorporating the right to a jury trial in 
criminal cases); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) (incorporating the 
defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 
339 (1962) (incorporating the right to counsel in non-capital criminal trials); Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (incorporating the right to counsel in capital trials). 
40 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
41 See In re Winship, 391 U.S. 385, 364, 367 (1970) (holding that all elements of a crime 
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of whether the defendant is tried as an 
adult or a juvenile); Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 749 (1948) (holding that in a 
federal trial for murder in the first degree, “the jury’s decision both upon guilt and whether 
the punishment of death should be imposed must be unanimous.”). 
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explicitly provide for them.
42
 
In Williams v. Florida, the Court held that Florida’s six-member jury 
statute satisfied the Sixth Amendment as carried to the states by Duncan v. 
Louisiana, which incorporated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
43
  
The Court found twelve-member juries were not “an indispensable 
component” of the goals and purposes of a jury trial.
44
  For the purposes 
here, there are two notable aspects to the decision. 
The first is that the Williams Court, in holding that a six-person jury 
would suffice for a state trial, found that the necessary consequence of the 
decision is that twelve-member juries are not constitutionally mandated in 
federal criminal trials either.  “Our holding does no more than leave these 
considerations to Congress and the States, unrestrained by an interpretation 
of the Sixth Amendment that would forever dictate the precise number that 
can constitute a jury.”
45
  The Court assumed that the constitutional 
requirements of a fair trial applied equally to federal and state courts.
46
 
The second is that the Court noted that a six-person jury can fulfill the 
constitutionally mandated duties and purposes of a jury just as well as a 
twelve-person jury, “particularly if the requirement for unanimity was 
retained.”
47
  The Court declined to address “whether or not the requirement 
of unanimity is an indispensable element of the Sixth Amendment jury 
trial.”  However, it did state that while much of its historical analysis 
applied equally to the unanimity requirement and the twelve-man jury, “the 
former, unlike the latter, may well serve an important role in the jury 
function, for example, as a device for insuring that the Government bear the 
heavier burden of proof.”
48
 
And yet, just two years later, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment 
did not impose a unanimity requirement on the states, while at the same 
time finding that unanimity was required in federal court.
49
  Apodaca v. 
Oregon and its sister case, Johnson v. Louisiana, upheld state procedures 
that allowed criminal verdicts on non-unanimous majority votes.  Oregon 
allows criminal defendants to be convicted on a ten-to-two vote, unless the 
 
42 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 465 (1942). 
43 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 
145, 149 (1968). 
44 Williams, 399 U.S. at 100. 
45 Id. at 103. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 100. 
48 Id. at 100 n.46. 
49 Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 366, 375 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). 
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charge is for murder, in which case eleven votes are required.
50
  Louisiana 
allowed for even fewer votes; only nine guilty votes out of twelve were 
required for a conviction.
51
  Apodaca found that unanimity was not essential 
to the function of the jury and therefore did not merit incorporation to the 
states; unanimity was, however, constitutionally mandated in federal 
criminal cases.
52
  Apodaca, then, not only rejected the dictum (from just two 
years prior) that the unanimity requirement “may well serve an important 
role in the jury function,” but it also rejected Duncan’s notion that the rights 
of defendants in criminal trials should not depend on whether the case was 
tried in state or federal court.
53
 
What is interesting about the Apodaca holding—and indeed it is this 
feature that generates doubt about its value—is that a plurality of the Court 
did not subscribe to any of its reasoning.  Four justices agreed that 
unanimity in verdicts is not necessary for a fair trial in either federal or state 
courts and thus concluded there was no constitutionally mandated 
unanimity requirement regardless of jurisdiction.
54
  In reaching this 
conclusion, Justice White, in an opinion joined by Justice Blackmun, 
Justice Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger, stated that majority verdicts do 
not compromise the function of the jury and that the reasonable-doubt 
standard applies to each individual juror rather than to the jury as a group.
55
  
Another four—Justices Stewart, Brennan, Marshall, and Douglas—took the 
opposite view, that unanimity was constitutionally required in both federal 
and state courts.
56
  Justice Powell broke the tie and found that unanimity 
 
50 OR. REV. STAT. § 136.450 (2009). 
51 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 782 (2010).  In 1972, the state did indeed only require 
nine votes, but now ten votes are necessary for a conviction.  1975 La. Acts 1st Ex. Sess. 81, 
82. 
52 Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410 (1972). 
53 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which—were they to be tried in a federal 
court—would come within the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee.”). 
54 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 411. 
55 Id. at 411–12.  Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion, adding only that he did 
not think the majority-verdict policy was a “wise one” but that did not mean it was 
“constitutionally offensive.”  Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365 (1972) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring).  He also noted that a majority-verdict system that allowed for a seven-to-five 
conviction would “afford [him] great difficulty.”  Id. at 366. 
56 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 414 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Johnson, 406 U.S. at 380 (Douglas, 
J., dissenting); id. at 395 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 399 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  In 
keeping with the disjointed spirit of the opinion, the dissenters filed four different opinions.  
But they all agreed that unanimity was a constitutional requirement, binding on the federal 
and state governments. 
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was required for federal courts, but it should not be incorporated to the 
states.
57
  Therefore, Justice Powell’s opinion is the sole reason why 
unanimity remains unincorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
despite the Court’s frequent dicta placing unanimity among the elements of 
a fair trial.  In fact, the most telling component of Apodaca is that eight out 
of nine Justices believed that unanimity requirements should apply equally 
to the state and federal courts.
58
 
B. APODACA V. OREGON 
Robert Apodaca, Henry Morgan Cooper, Jr., and James Arnold 
Madden were “convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, burglary in a 
dwelling, and grand larceny” during different trials in Oregon state courts.
59
  
All of the juries returned non-unanimous verdicts.
60
  Apodaca and Madden 
were convicted by a vote of eleven to one; Cooper was convicted by a vote 
of ten to two (the minimum vote for a conviction).
61
  The Oregon Court of 
Appeals affirmed their convictions, the Supreme Court of Oregon denied 
review, and all three defendants petitioned the Supreme Court of the United 
States on the basis that majority verdicts in criminal trials violate the Sixth 
Amendment, which applied to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
62
  In Johnson v. Louisiana, decided on the same day as 
Apodaca, Mr. Johnson was arrested in his home in Louisiana without an 
arrest warrant after the victim of an armed robbery identified Johnson as the 
perpetrator from photographs.
63
  Johnson was found guilty by a nine-to-





57 Johnson, 406 U.S. at 395–96 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
58 Id. (“In any event, the affirmance must not obscure that the majority of the Court 
remains of the view that, as in the case of every specific of the Bill of Rights that extends to 
the States, the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee, however it is to be construed, has 
identical application against both State and Federal Governments.”). 
59 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 405–06. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 406. 
62 Id.; see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149–50 (1968) (incorporating the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial). 
63 Johnson, 406 U.S. at 358.  There is a functional difference between the validity of the 
claims in Apodaca and Johnson: due to the timing of Duncan v. Louisiana, the Sixth 
Amendment was not applicable to Johnson’s case, and therefore Johnson did not have a right 
to a jury at all.  However, again, in terms of analysis of the relevant issues at hand, the 
opinions can be treated as one and the same. 
64 Id. 
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In deciding these two companion cases, Justice White, joined by 
Justice Blackmun, Justice Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger, followed 
the Court’s reasoning in Williams and held that the Sixth Amendment did 
not require unanimity in state or federal criminal trials.
65
  The plurality 
found, as in Williams, that there was an “inability to divine ‘the intent of the 
Framers’ when they eliminated references to the ‘accustomed requisites’” in 
the language of the Sixth Amendment.
66
  Due to this impossibility, the 
Justices needed to “turn to other than purely historical considerations” in 
“determining what is meant by a jury.”
67
  The opinion thus focused upon 
the jury trial’s “interposition between the accused and his accuser of the 
commonsense judgment of a group of laymen,”
68
 and the jury’s role as a 
“safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the 
compliant, biased or eccentric judge.”
69
  In these cases, the Court asked 
whether majority verdicts lessen the reliability of the jury’s verdict or 
diminish the quality of jury deliberations—questions that the plurality 
answered in the negative.
70
  But current jury research contradicts the 
intuition of the plurality.
71
 
The plurality ultimately concluded that there was “no difference 
between juries required to act unanimously and those permitted to convict 
or acquit by votes of 10 to two or 11 to one.”
72
  The Court also noted with 
approval that majority verdicts would reduce the number of hung juries, 
which are costly to the judicial system in terms of perceived wasted 
resources and the subsequent costs of relitigating.
73
 
The plurality likewise rejected the petitioners’ argument that majority 
verdicts threaten the reasonable-doubt standard, stating that the burden of 
proof constitutionally mandated in criminal trials is not found in the Sixth 
Amendment.
74
  Furthermore, Justice White wrote that there was “no basis” 
for thinking that “when minority jurors express sincere doubts” they would 
be ignored by the fellow jurors, “even if deliberation has not been 
 
65 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 406. 
66 Id. at 410.  For a discussion of the legislative history of the Sixth Amendment, see 
infra Part III.A. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970)). 
69 Id. (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)). 
70 Taylor-Thompson, supra note 13, at 1310. 
71 Id.; see also infra Part III.C. 
72 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 411. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 411–12; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970). 
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exhausted and minority jurors have grounds for acquittal which, if pursued, 
might persuade members of the majority to acquit.”
75
  Justice White 
asserted: “That rational men disagree is not in itself equivalent to a failure 
of proof by the State, nor does it indicate infidelity to the reasonable-doubt 
standard.”
76
  Notably, the plurality rejected the contention that “majority 
jurors, aware of their responsibility and power over the liberty of the 
defendant, would simply refuse to listen to arguments presented to them in 
favor of acquittal, terminate discussion, and render a verdict.”
77
 
The petitioners also claimed that majority verdicts interfere with the 
“effective application” of the requirement that jury panels reflect a cross 
section of the community.
78
  In response, the plurality stated that, despite 
the prohibition against systematic exclusion of groups from juries,
79
 it 
cannot be said that “every distinct voice in the community has a right to be 
represented on every jury and a right to prevent conviction of a defendant in 
any case.”
80
  Furthermore, the Court made some very optimistic 
assumptions that the voices of ethnic and racial minorities would be heard 
and seriously considered and stated that there was “no proof” that votes 




The dissenting voices, Justices Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, and 
Stewart, came to the opposite conclusions.
82
  They found that the Sixth 
Amendment required unanimity in federal criminal trials and that the 
Fourteenth Amendment required that this provision be applied to the 
states.
83
  Justice Brennan worried in his dissent, “if we construe the Bill of 
 
75 Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 361 (1972). 
76 Id. at 362. 
77 Id. at 361. 
78 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 412–13; see Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 510–12 (1967); 
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 131–32 (1940); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589 (1935); 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309–10 (1880). 
79 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (forbidding gender-based 
exclusions from the jury); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (forbidding race-
based exclusions). 
80 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 413 (1972). 
81 Id. at 413–14. 
82 Id. at 414 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Johnson, 406 U.S. at 380 (Douglas, J., dissenting); 
id. at 395 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 399 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
83 Johnson, 406 U.S. at 380 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Indeed, in the Johnson dissent 
(from the majority’s conclusion that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury did not apply), 
Justice Stewart, with whom Justices Brennan and Marshall agreed, argued that if the 
Fourteenth Amendment alone requires that a state must “accord the right of trial by jury in a 
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Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to permit States to ‘experiment’ 
with the basic rights of people, we open a veritable Pandora’s box.”
84
 
Thus Justice Powell’s concurring opinion decided that the Sixth 
Amendment required unanimous verdicts in federal court, but not in state 
court.
85
  Had Justice Powell joined the White opinion wholly, it is possible 
that there would still be literature calling for a reexamination of Apodaca 
due to the empirical conclusions about jury behavior that were not available 
to the Justices in 1972.  But because Justice Powell’s decisive opinion held 
that the unanimity requirement applies to federal and not state courts, the 
Court needs to reexamine the issue under the incorporation standards 
recently affirmed in McDonald.
86
 
Justice Powell concurred in the plurality result that a defendant may be 
constitutionally convicted in state court by a majority verdict, but he was 
“not in accord with a major premise upon which that judgment is based.”
87
  
Justice Powell disagreed that the jury trial, as applied to the states under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, needed to be “identical in every detail” to federal 
jury trials under the Sixth Amendment.
88
  “I do not think that all the 
elements of jury trial within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment are 
necessarily embodied or incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”
89
  It is that precise holding that is most directly 
contradicted by the Court’s standard of incorporation set out in McDonald. 
Acknowledging history and precedent, Justice Powell stated that “[i]n 
an unbroken line of cases reaching back into the late 1800’s, the Justices of 
this Court have recognized, virtually without dissent, that unanimity is one 
of the indispensable features of federal jury trial.”
90
  However, with respect 
to state trials, Justice Powell looked to “cases decided when the intendment 
of that Amendment was not as clouded by the passage of time” before 
concluding that “due process does not require that the States apply the 
federal jury-trial right with all its gloss.”
91
  Indeed, Justice Powell had 
 
criminal case, then only a unanimous jury can return a constitutionally valid verdict.”  Id. at 
397 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
84 Id. at 387 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
85 See id. at 373–74 (Powell, J., concurring). 
86 Id.; McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034–36 (2010); see infra Part 
III.A. 




91 Id. at 371. 
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precedential support in his contention, quoting Justice Peckham: 
When providing in their constitution and legislation for the manner in which civil or 
criminal actions shall be tried, it is in entire conformity with the character of the 
Federal Government that [the States] should have the right to decide for themselves 
what shall be the form and character of the procedure in such trials, . . . whether there 




Further, the Court held in 1912 that “in criminal cases due process of law is 
not denied by a state law which dispenses with . . . the necessity of a jury of 
twelve, or unanimity in the verdict.”
93
 
Justice Powell conceded that these precedents concluded that states 
could even do away with jury trials completely—a conclusion which was 
“grounded on a more limited view of due process” than the Court accepted 
in 1972, and which the Court rejected in Duncan.
94
  However, Justice 
Powell found nothing in Duncan or other precedents which would 
“require[] repudiation of the views expressed in Maxwell and Jordan with 
respect to . . . the unanimity of [a jury’s] verdict.”
95
  Indeed, Justice Powell 
found that to consider unanimity “so fundamental to the essentials of jury 
trial that this particular requirement of the Sixth Amendment is necessarily 
binding on the States” would give “unwarranted and unwise scope to the 
incorporation doctrine.”
96
  Justice Powell thought, as did the plurality, that 
the function of the jury in a majority verdict was not compromised, and he 
endorsed the notion that states should be allowed to “become a ‘laboratory’ 
and to experiment with a range of trial and procedural alternatives.”
97
 
The history of the incorporation doctrine has been one of expansion.  
Of those rights that are not incorporated, the right to a unanimous verdict in 
a criminal trial is perhaps the most cherished to modern sensibilities.  The 
notion that the outcome of a criminal trial hinges on whether it was brought 
in state or federal court is contrary to the raison d’etre of the incorporation 
doctrine.
98
  Perhaps in 1972, the incorporation doctrine was not expanded 
 
92 Id. at 371–72 (quoting Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605 (1900)). 
93 Id. at 372 (quoting Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912)). 
94 Id. 
95 Id.; Maxwell, 176 U.S. 581; Jordan, 225 U.S. 167. 
96 Johnson, 406 U.S. at 372 (Powell, J., concurring). 
97 Id. at 376.  A key factor to the “laboratory” argument is that states would ultimately 
reject those experiments that were subsequently found to have failed.  Arguably, majority 
verdicts have been empirically discredited as inferior to unanimous verdicts, see infra Part 
III.C, yet Oregon and Louisiana remain steadfast. 
98 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035 (2010).  The Court reiterated that 
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so far as to include the Sixth Amendment guarantees, but in 2010, after the 
incorporation of the Second Amendment in McDonald,
99
 the answer as to 
whether unanimity is fundamental enough to the American criminal system 
as to warrant incorporation is unequivocally “yes.” 
III. WHY APODACA SHOULD BE REVERSED 
The venerable principle of stare decisis counsels that Supreme Court 
holdings should not be overturned but for very compelling reasons.  But the 
principle is weakest when considering the continued propriety of 
constitutional rules of procedure, such as the holding of Apodaca.
100
  The 
Court has proved willing to overturn cases in the past when there have been 
serious errors in analysis, or, as in this case, if the available social science 
data requires a reexamination of previously held beliefs.
101
  Apodaca is one 
such case that is ripe for reexamination. 
Firstly, Part III.A argues that the McDonald stance against the two-
tiered incorporation scheme compels the Court to reassess those provisions 
of the Bill of Rights that remain unincorporated.
102
  Under this analysis, the 
unanimity requirement satisfies the McDonald test for incorporation: it is a 
historically ingrained principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence and is 
supported by dicta and binding precedent.  Furthermore, Part III.B argues 
that a non-unanimous jury casts doubt upon the notion of ‘beyond a 
reasonable doubt,’ depriving defendants in Oregon and Louisiana of due 
process.  Finally, Part III.C argues that there are compelling policy 
arguments for requiring jury unanimity.  The Apodaca Court based much of 
its determination that unanimity is not a fundamental right on its 
assumption that a majority-verdict jury would function much the same as a 
unanimous one.
103
  However, social science has found the opposite in 
 
different standards should not apply “depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state 
or federal court.”  Id.; see also infra Part III.C. 
99 Id. at 3020. 
100 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (“Stare decisis is not an inexorable 
command . . . .  This is particularly true in constitutional cases, because in such cases 
‘correction through legislative action is practically impossible.’  Considerations in favor of 
stare decisis are at their acme in cases . . . where reliance interests are involved; the opposite 
is true in cases such as the present one involving procedural and evidentiary rules.” (citations 
omitted) (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 (1931) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting))). 
101 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that segregation 
in public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
102 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3020. 
103 Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410–11 (1972). 
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studies since the Apodaca holding.
104
  Therefore, the bedrock of the 
Apodaca holding has been seriously undermined by the past forty years of 
empirical data. 
A. APODACA IS CONTRARY TO THE INCORPORATION STANDARD OF 
MCDONALD 
The hard stance taken on incorporation in McDonald is certainly the 
timeliest reason to reconsider Apodaca.  Simply, the McDonald decision 
fully rejected the two-track notion of constitutional interpretation.
105
  In 
ruling that the Second Amendment was fully incorporated to the states, the 
Court finally and completely “abandoned ‘the notion that the Fourteenth 
Amendment applies to the States only [in] a watered-down, subjective 
version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights.’”
106
  The Court 
rightly held that different standards should not apply “depending on 
whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal court.”
107
 
The Court found that the doctrine of incorporation was so settled by 
precedent that, unless it “turn[ed] back the clock or adopt[ed] a special 
incorporation test applicable only to the Second Amendment,” the right of 
an individual to own a firearm had to be upheld, regardless of 
jurisdiction.
108
  Under the incorporation doctrine as set out through 
precedent, “if a Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental” to American 
jurisprudence, that right is “fully binding on the States.”
109
  As will be 
shown, unanimous verdicts in criminal trial are indeed ‘fundamental’ to 
American jurisprudence based on historical considerations and prior 
decisions by the Court. 
The analysis is straightforward.  The Court recently reaffirmed that 
“incorporated Bill of Rights protections ‘are all to be enforced against the 
States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards 
that protect those personal rights against federal encroachment.’”
110
  And 
the Court has not wavered in its contention that the Sixth Amendment 
requires unanimous juries in federal criminal trials.
111
  Yet, as discussed 
 
104 See infra Part III.C. 
105 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035. 
106 Id. (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1964)). 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 3046. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 3058. 
111 See Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748–49 (1948); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 
U.S. 197, 211–12 (1903); see also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 211 (1965), overruled 
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above, Justice Powell’s concurring opinion, written at a time when 
incorporation was a more limited doctrine, means that the Jury Trial Clause 
is subject to the “two-track,” “watered-down,” partial incorporation that the 
Court expressly rejected in McDonald.
112
 
Indeed, the McDonald opinion already opens the door for overturning 
Apodaca.  In a lengthy footnote, the Court discusses the oddness of the 
Apodaca holding, stating that the ruling “was the result of an unusual 
division among the Justices, not an endorsement of the two-track approach 
to incorporation.”
113
  It even goes so far to say that Apodaca does not 
“undermine the well-established rule that incorporated Bill of Rights 
protections apply identically to the States and the Federal Government.”
114
  
Furthermore, the Court quotes Justice Brennan’s dissent, which reiterates 
that eight out of nine Justices believed that the Sixth Amendment’s 




Beyond addressing Apodaca explicitly, McDonald, in its history of 
incorporation, addresses the special need for incorporation of those rights 
that concern criminal process.
116
  Referring to those cases that incorporated 
jury trials, the right to counsel, the reasonable-doubt standard, the 
Confrontation Clause and others, the Court stated that this line of cases 
proves that the Court has concluded that “to ensure a criminal trial satisfies 
essential standards of fairness,” some trial procedures need to be identical in 
state and federal courts.
117
  “The need for certainty and uniformity is more 
pressing, and the margin for error slimmer, when criminal justice is at 
issue.”
118
  Of course, it is impossible to predict how the Court would 
approach one topic based upon dicta on another one.  But the Court must 
have found the issue of incorporation of criminal procedure guarantees 
fairly important in order to devote time in an opinion about gun rights. 
 
on other grounds by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (supporting the proposition in 
dictum). 




116 Id. at 3094 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
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1. Unanimous Verdicts Are Historically Ingrained in Anglo-American 
Jurisprudence 
Unanimous verdicts—both in civil and criminal trials—have been a 
feature of the Anglo-American legal system for centuries.  Although a 
unanimous verdict was not always required at the very beginning of the 
jury, by 1367, during the rule of Edward III, a unanimity requirement rule 
was established.
119
  By the time of Edward IV’s reign (1461–1483), the 
unanimity requirement was the norm, absent the consent of both parties.
120
  
Even in fourteenth century Parliaments (where the numbers were such that 
a unanimity requirement was vastly more impractical than for a jury), there 
is evidence that a majority vote was deemed insufficient to bind the 
community or its individual members to a legal decision.
121
  Blackstone 
stated in his Commentaries that “[i]t is the most transcendent privilege 
which any subject can enjoy, or wish for, that he cannot be affected either in 
his property, his liberty, or his person, but by the unanimous consent of 
twelve of his neighbors and equals.”
122
 
At the founding of the United States, James Madison proposed that the 
Bill of Rights should protect those provisions of the common-law jury that 
were deemed most vital.
123
  His proposed Sixth Amendment guaranteed the 
right to trial, “by an impartial jury of freeholders of the vicinage, with the 
requisite of unanimity for conviction, of the right of challenge, and other 
accustomed requisites.”
124
  However, there was some disagreement as to the 
vicinage requirement and thus the Sixth Amendment was adopted in its 
present language, omitting any reference to unanimity.
125
 
There are two plausible reasons as to why the unanimity requirement 
was dropped from the language of the Amendment: either it was intended to 
have a substantive effect, or the concept of unanimity was so implicit that 
the Founders thought it did not require mention.  The Williams and 
Apodaca opinions held the former, at least as it concerned unanimity and a 
 
119 Douglas Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 397 (1996). 
120 Id. 
121 M. V. CLARKE, MEDIEVAL REPRESENTATION AND CONSENT 251 (2d ed. 1964). 
122 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379 (emphasis added). 
123 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (1789). 
124 Id. 
125 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  The particulars of the vicinage requirement differed 
regionally, and the Founders eventually omitted the requirement rather than find a solution 
that suited everyone.  See 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 424 n.1 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904). 




  However, given other extrinsic evidence, the latter 
seems more probable. 
In a 1789 letter, James Madison wrote of his frustration in finalizing 
the wording of the Sixth Amendment so that the first Congress would agree 
to it: “They are equally inflexible in opposing a definition of the locality of 
Juries.  The vicinage they contend is either too vague or too strict a 
term.”
127
  Madison further could not achieve consensus on his proposal of 
the insertion of “accustomed requisites” after the word ‘Juries,’ because 
“[t]he truth is that in most of the States the practice is different, and hence 
the irreconcilable difference of ideas on the subject.”
128
  However, the 
“irreconcilable difference” was the question of from where the jurors should 
be drawn, not the question of unanimity.  Non-unanimous verdicts were not 
historically common among the states.
129
 
Likewise, in discussing the wording of the ninth section of the Bill of 
Rights of the Pennsylvania Constitution in 1788, which includes an express 
provision that verdicts shall be unanimous, Chief Justice M’Kean found the 
stipulation to be unnecessary.
130
  “I have always understood it to be the law, 
independent of this section,” he stated, “that the twelve jurors must be 




Further, in 1833, Justice Story noted in his Commentaries that the jury 
trial was “now incorporated into all our State constitutions as a fundamental 
right, and the Constitution of the United States would have been justly 
obnoxious to the most conclusive objection if it had not recognized and 
confirmed it in the most solemn terms.”
132
  In a footnote, he defined that 
jury right quickly and simply: “[a] trial by jury is generally understood to 
mean . . . a trial by jury of twelve men . . . who must unanimously concur in 
 
126 Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410 (1972); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 97 
(1970). 
127 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 125 (emphasis omitted).  The House of 
Representatives passed the Amendment “in substantially this form but after more than a 
week of debate in the Senate it returned to the House considerably altered.”  Williams, 399 
U.S. at 94 (citing S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1789)). 
128 Id. 
129 Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions 
When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in 
American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 77 (2008). 
130 Smith, supra note 119, at 428 n.206. 
131 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dall. 319, 323 (Pa. 1788)). 
132 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 559 
(Melville M. Bigelow ed., William S. Hein & Co., Inc., ed., 1994) (1891). 
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the guilt of the accused . . . .  Any law, therefore, dispensing with any of 
these requisites, may be considered unconstitutional.”
133
  More recent Court 
decisions support the notion that the common-law definition of jury trial is 
constitutionally protected: in Giles v. California, the Court stated that the 




2. Unanimous Verdicts Are Supported by Precedent and Other Persuasive 
Authority 
Furthermore, dicta of the Court imply that unanimity was taken for 
granted as an essential feature of the American trial.  In Thompson v. Utah, 
the Court held that because Utah was still a territory, and thus a federal 
entity, unanimity was required in criminal trials.
135
  Justice Harlan aptly 
asserted that he for one thought that the Constitution required unanimity 
because “the wise men who framed the Constitution of the United States 
and the people who approved it were of opinion that life and liberty, when 
involved in criminal prosecutions, would not be adequately secured except 
through the unanimous verdict of twelve jurors.”
136
  To come to this 
conclusion, the Court went back to Hale’s Pleas of the Crown, which stated 
“[t]he law of England hath afforded the best method of trial, that is possible 
. . . namely, by a jury of twelve men all concurring.”
137
  Justice Harlan 
found that the words “jury” and “trial by jury” were used in the Constitution 
“with reference to the meaning affixed to them” in common law at the time 
of its adoption.
138
  While this holding applied only to the federal 
government, it is telling that in 1898 the Justices found it axiomatic that the 
Constitution mandated that verdicts should be unanimous in criminal trials. 
Indeed, just one year prior to Thompson, the Court held that unanimity 
was required in civil trials; again, the Territory of Utah accepted majority 
verdicts, which the Court held was unconstitutional.
139
  In so ruling, the 
Court kept its analysis short and to the point: “unanimity was one of the 
peculiar and essential features of trial by jury at the common law.  No 
 
133 Id. at 559 n.2 (emphasis omitted). 
134 Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 375 (2008). 
135 Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350–51 (1898). 
136 Id. at 353. 
137 Id. at 350 (quoting 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 33 (1736)). 
138 Id. 
139 American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 468 (1897). 
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authorities are needed to sustain this proposition.”
140
  If no authorities are 
needed to say that unanimity was an essential feature of trials in civil cases, 
it is even less necessary to elaborate on its importance in a criminal trial. 
In the 1953 case of Hibdon v. United States, the Sixth Circuit ruled 
that a defendant cannot waive his right to a unanimous verdict, unlike his 
right to trial or a jury comprised of less than twelve.
141
  In support of the 
holding, the court stated that even though “the requirement of a unanimous 
verdict is nowhere defined in the Constitution,” it is “the inescapable 
element of due process that has come down to us from earliest time.”
142
  
The court also looked to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, finding 
its provision that “[t]he verdict shall be unanimous” to be persuasive.
143
  
Furthermore, the court cited the fact that Rule 29(a) of the First Preliminary 
Draft of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provided the parties could 
stipulate to a majority verdict so long as the court approved.
144
  However, 
this proposal “was so vigorously criticized by bench and bar” because it did 
not provide “sufficient protection to a defendant” that it was eliminated 
from the final Rule.
145
  Like other courts, Hibdon found that the 
implications of the reasonable-doubt standard were the most compelling 
reason to mandate unanimity: 
To sustain the validity of a verdict by less than all of the jurors is to destroy this test of 
proof for there cannot be a verdict supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt if 
one or more jurors remain reasonably in doubt as to guilt . . . . the right to unanimous 
verdict cannot under any circumstances be waived, that it is of the very essence of our 
traditional concept of due process in criminal cases, and that the verdict in this case is 
a nullity because it is not the unanimous verdict of the jury as to guilt.
146
 
Of course, the Sixth Circuit’s decision is not binding upon the Supreme 
Court.  But it is telling that a federal court of appeals found the right to be 
so vital to the American trial that it could not even be waived—unlike the 
trial itself.  Beyond these cases, there lies an almost unbroken line of 




140 Id. at 468. 
141 204 F.2d 834, 838 (1953). 
142 Id. at 838. 
143 Id. at 836 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a)). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 838. 
147 Taylor-Thompson, supra note 13, at 206; see also Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 
276, 288 (1930) (noting that the right to a jury trial is best understood as a right to the 
common-law jury, which requires a unanimous verdict of twelve); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 
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Another source that is not binding upon the Court but should be 
considered persuasive is the American Bar Association’s view.  After the 
ABA’s own research of jury trials, in 1976 the ABA’s Commission on 
Standards of Judicial Administration published its Standards as related to 
Trial Courts.
148
  Standard 2.10 states that “[t]he verdict of the jury [in 
criminal cases] should be unanimous.”
149
  This standard has not changed in 
the past forty years.
150
  The Court has recently affirmed its confidence in the 
conclusions by the ABA, stating in 2005 that the Court “long ha[s] referred 
to these ABA Standards as guides to determining what is reasonable.”
151
  
The ABA, in an amicus brief on this topic (in support of Bowen v. Oregon, 
decided before McDonald) aptly summed up its position on why Apodaca 
should be reexamined: 
Because each member of the Apodaca Court agreed on the importance of thorough 
jury deliberations, attention to minority viewpoints, and community confidence in jury 
verdicts, and because the ABA’s review of research and empirical data, as well as the 
consensus of the legal community, has concluded that the opposite occurs through the 




In short, the right to unanimous juries in criminal trials satisfies the 
McDonald standard for incorporation: it is historically ingrained in Anglo-
American jurisprudence, there is persuasive dicta in favor of the right, and 
other sources to which the Court has looked to guidance before are 
unwavering in their support of it. 
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF UNANIMITY IN SATISFYING “BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT” 
Majority verdicts in criminal trials undermine the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard.  The Court not only mentioned the importance 
 
U.S. 581, 586 (1900) (“[A]s the right of trial by jury in certain suits at common law is 
preserved by the Seventh Amendment, such a trial implies that there shall be a unanimous 
verdict of twelve jurors in all Federal courts where a jury trial is held.”). 
148 Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association in Support of Petitioner at 3, 
Bowen v. Oregon, 130 S. Ct. 52 (2009) (No. 08-1117).  This exact provision remains in 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY § 15(1.1)(c) (1996). 
149 Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association in Support of Petitioner, supra 
note 148, at 3. 
150 Id. 
151 Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 
510, 524 (2003)). 
152 Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association in Support of Petitioner, supra 
note 148, at 4. 
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of unanimity in those cases which concerned themselves with trial 
procedure; one of the more dramatic statements as to the importance of 
unanimous verdicts was in an opinion on the applicability of search and 
seizure laws to phone calls.
153
  Referring to it as an “indestructible 
principle” of American criminal law, the Court stated in Billeci v. United 
States that “[g]uilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.  All 
twelve jurors must be convinced beyond that doubt.”
154
  The opinion 
continued, “[t]hese principles are not pious platitudes recited to placate the 
shades of venerated legal ancients.  They are working rules of law binding 
upon the court.”
155
  The practical implications of these requirements were 
clear: “the prosecutor in a criminal case must actually overcome the 




Regarding majority verdicts, Justice Marshall stated in Johnson that 
when a “prosecutor has tried and failed to persuade those [minority] jurors 
of the defendant’s guilt . . . .  it does violence to language and to logic to 




Indeed, In re Winship solidified that the reasonable-doubt standard was 
constitutionally required.
158
  The Apodaca dissenters operated under many 
of the same assumptions as the Winship Court.
159
  The Constitution does not 
contain the phrase “beyond a reasonable doubt,” but the Court found that 
common-law adherence to the burden was persuasive of the necessity for 
constitutional protection.
160
  “Although virtually unanimous adherence to 
the reasonable-doubt standard in common-law jurisdictions may not 
conclusively establish it as a requirement of due process, such adherence 
does ‘reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be 
enforced and justice administered.’”
161
  Furthermore, the Winship Court 
relied upon dicta from past decisions: “Expressions in many opinions of this 
Court indicate that it has long been assumed that proof of a criminal charge 
 
153 Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394 (1950). 
154 Id. at 403 (emphasis added). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 401 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
158 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). 
159 See Johnson, 406 U.S. at 400–01 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
160 In re Winship, 387 U.S. at 361–62 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 
(1968)). 
161 Id. 
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beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required.”
162 
Similarly, there is virtually unanimous adherence to the doctrine of 
unanimity in common law; the federal government and forty-eight states 
require unanimous verdicts in criminal trials.  Also like the reasonable-
doubt standard, many instances of the Court’s dicta take the unanimity 
requirement for granted.  It is difficult to see how within just two years the 
Court did not find these same authorities to be persuasive.  Indeed, in 
Justice Douglas’s dissent from Johnson, he reasoned as much, referencing 
Winship: 
The Constitution does not mention unanimous juries.  Neither does it mention . . . that 
guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in all criminal cases.  Yet it is almost 
inconceivable that anyone would have questioned whether proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt was in fact the constitutional standard.  And, indeed, when such a case finally 
arose we had little difficulty disposing of the issue.
163
 
And again, during the same term as Winship, the Court mentioned in 
Williams that, should the issue of unanimity be brought to the Court, it 
would be more problematic to dismiss it as a constitutional necessity.
164
  
Unlike the twelve-person jury, unanimity “may well serve an important role 
. . . as a device for insuring that the Government bear the heavier burden of 
proof.”
165
  Despite the Court’s foresight, it ultimately came down the other 
way. 
Of course, it is not that the Apodaca plurality ignored the reasonable-
doubt requirement in their analysis.  Instead, it was determined that a 
majority verdict did not, in and of itself, imply that the Winship reasonable-
doubt burden had not been met.
166
  A crucial question was whether the 
burden of proof applied to the mind of each individual juror “or to the 
‘group mind’ of the jury as an entity.”
167
  If the Court adopted the theory 
that the reasonable-doubt standard applied to the group mind, “majority 
verdicts would clearly be violative of due process since any dissenting juror 
would cast a reasonable doubt upon the entire jury.”
168
 
Clearly, the plurality in Apodaca determined that the reasonable-doubt 
standard applies to the mind of an individual juror, which is why a majority 
 
162 Id. at 362. 
163 Johnson, 406 U.S. at 381 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
164 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 n.46 (1970). 
165 Id. 
166 Johnson, 406 U.S. at 362. 
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verdict does not cast doubt upon the sufficiency of the evidence.  Writing in 
the Johnson opinion, Justice White explained that the reasonable-doubt 
standard was not threatened by majority verdicts, because “the mere fact” 
that there were three holdout jurors “does not in itself demonstrate that, had 
the nine jurors of the majority attended further to reason and the evidence, 
all or one of them would have developed a reasonable doubt.”
169
  Justice 
White did concede, however, that “the State’s proof could perhaps be 
regarded as more certain if it had convinced all 12 jurors instead of only 
nine.”
170
  However, it has not been determined what majority would no 
longer be constitutionally sufficient.  Apodaca held that a nine-to-three 
conviction was constitutionally permissible, but would a seven-to-five 
verdict be considered adequate?  In his Johnson concurrence, Justice 
Blackmun, for one, stated that if a state employed a seven-to-five standard it 




Indeed, proponents of majority verdicts usually cite efficiency as their 
main concern, and majority verdicts would certainly increase the efficiency 
of jury deliberations.
172
  However, even the supporters of majority verdicts 
acknowledge that reasonable-doubt concerns increase as the majority’s size 
decreases.  “Part of [the] price” of greater efficiency in the courts “would be 
a weakening of the reasonable doubt standard.”
173
  The debate between 
majority and unanimous verdicts is even portrayed as a trade-off between 
the accuracy of the verdict and the efficiency of the deliberations: “[w]ith 
unanimity, however, the reasonable doubt standard would be satisfied, 
although the inefficiency factor would then have its strongest effect.”
174
  
Indeed, the Oregon and Louisiana legislatures acknowledged this trade-off; 
when the charge is first-degree murder, both states require unanimity.
175
  
The only conceivable reason why the legislatures would have done so 
would be so that those verdicts have greater certainty.
176
  In all lesser 
 
169 Johnson, 406 U.S. at 361. 
170 Id. at 362. 
171 Id. at 366. 
172 See, e.g., Michael H. Glasser, Letting the Supermajority Rule: Nonunanimous Jury 
Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 675 (1997); Robert F. Holland, 
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CRIMINOLOGY 101, 125 (2006). 
173 R.L.M., supra note 167, at 97. 
174 Id. at 98. 
175 OR. CONST. art. I, § 11; LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 782(A). 
176 Reply Brief for Petitioner on Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 20, at 7–8. 
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crimes, the states have decided, as the Oregon Supreme Court put it, “to 
make it easier to obtain convictions.”
177
  While arguments as to the relative 
benefits in the accuracy of the verdict versus the efficiency of the 
proceeding and number of convictions are well and good in an academic 
discourse, they have no part in the American courts, the overriding goal of 
which should be to ensure the innocent are not wrongfully convicted. 
Like the unanimity requirement, the reasonable-doubt standard is not 
expressly provided for in the language of the Sixth Amendment.  But it had 
for so long been assumed at common law that this was the required standard 
that the Court had no trouble holding that it was constitutionally required 
for both federal and state courts.  Problematically, majority verdicts do in 
fact lessen the burden of proof.  Justice Blackmun and indeed the Oregon 
and Louisiana legislatures effectively conceded this point, for otherwise 
there would be no reason to require a greater number of votes for the most 
serious crimes.  
C. THE APODACA COURT WAS INCORRECT IN ASSUMING MAJORITY 
VERDICTS DO NOT AFFECT THE FUNCTION OF THE JURY 
The plurality in Apodaca held unanimity was not constitutionally 
required under the assumption that a jury instructed to come to a majority 
verdict would function the same as one instructed to come to a unanimous 
verdict; any difference in the deliberations would be slight enough not to 
raise any doubts about due process.
178
  The Justices who came to this 
conclusion, however, relied on nothing more than their own assumptions, 
experiences as judges, and one empirical study, for the proposition that 
majority verdicts will result in fewer hung juries.
179
  Nevertheless, the 
plurality assumed that non-unanimous jury deliberations would be “as 
robust, and that minority viewpoints would be as thoroughly represented, as 
in deliberations by” unanimous juries.
180
  While those opinions may have 
been valid based on the information from which the Justices drew, there 
have since been countless jury behavior studies that tell quite a different 
story. 
 
177 Oregon ex rel. Smith v. Sawyer, 501 P.2d 792, 793 (Or. 1972). 
178 Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410–11 (1972). 
179 Id.; HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 461 (1966). 
180 Brief of Jeffrey Abramson et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1–2, 
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1. Majority Verdicts and Robust Deliberations 
The most obvious disadvantage, functionally, of a majority-verdict 
jury is that the jurors are “quite conscious” that a majority vote will 
suffice.
181
  This fact was anticipated by Justice Douglas in Johnson, who 
felt that majority verdicts, “eliminate[] the circumstances in which a 
minority of jurors (a) could have rationally persuaded the entire jury to 
acquit, or (b) while unable to persuade the majority to acquit, nonetheless 
could have convinced them to convict only on a lesser-included offense.”
182
  
In a study by Professor Shari Diamond of actual Arizona civil juries (in 
which only six of eight jurors must agree), some of the juries did attempt to 
persuade jurors initially in the minority, even when those votes were not 
necessary to return a verdict.
183
  In other cases, the majority, knowing that 
the vote would be sufficient for a verdict, “terminated any attempt to 




Even more telling are data from the Appellate Division of the Oregon 
Office of Public Defense Services.  The Division analyzed felony jury trial 
records for 46.5% of all felony jury trials in Oregon between 2007 and 
2008; the juries were polled in 63% of those trials, and in 65.5% of trials in 
which the final vote was known, the jury reached a non-unanimous verdict 
on at least one of the counts.
185
  This means that in nearly two thirds of all 
the trials in which the final vote was known, at least one of the jurors 
dissented on at least one of the counts.
186
  Proponents of majority votes 
frequently frame their argument around the notion that they are trying to 
prevent the occasional irrational or obstinate juror from hijacking the 
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13 (2006). 
184 Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association in Support of Petitioner, supra 
note 148, at 6; Diamond, Rose & Murphy, supra note 183. 
185 OREGON OFFICE OF PUBLIC SERVICES APPELLATE DIVISION, ON THE FREQUENCY OF 
NON-UNANIMOUS FELONY VERDICTS IN OREGON 4 (2009); Brief of Amicus Curiae American 
Bar Association in Support of Petitioner, supra note 148, at 7. 
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  However, the results from Oregon—which reveal that 
majority verdicts are common, perhaps occurring even in a majority of all 
felony trials—cast doubt on that argument. 
Robust deliberations are necessary for more important reasons than 
that all jurors feel as though they had a say in the final verdict.  They 
provide an opportunity for jurors “to persuade their fellow jurors to change 
course”; but this need not be the complete turnaround of Twelve Angry Men 
to be important to the deliberations.
188
  Deliberation “allows dissenters to 
point out nuances that might lead to a consensus that not all charges have 
been proved, or that a lesser included charge is more appropriate, after a 
more thoughtful and through consideration of the evidence.”
189
  Otherwise, 
in a majority-verdict system, the reaction to minority viewpoints can be as 
harsh as one found in Professor Diamond’s study, wherein one juror 
informed another, “All right, no offense, but we are going to ignore you.”
190
  
Majority-verdict deliberations tend to be more verdict-driven, meaning that 
the jurors are more likely to take the first ballot during the first ten minutes 
of deliberation and to vote frequently until they reach a verdict.
191
  
Unanimous-verdict juries, on the other hand, tend to be more evidence-
driven, generally delaying their first votes until the evidence has been 
discussed.
192
  As will be discussed shortly, this tendency can have an effect 
on the participation (or lack thereof) of women jurors.
193
 
2. Majority Verdicts and Group Representation 
From a functional standpoint, juries are supposed to be drawn from a 
representative cross section of the community.
194
  The Court has rejected 
both gender- and race-based attempts to exclude jurors;
195
 members of all 
groups have a right to be part of the judicial system.  Justice Brennan, in his 
dissent in Johnson, addressed this issue: “In my opinion, the right of all 
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groups in this Nation to participate in the criminal process means the right 
to have their voices heard.”
196
  Majority verdicts threaten this principle 
because, “[w]hen verdicts must be unanimous, no member of the jury may 
be ignored by the others.  When less than unanimity is sufficient, 
consideration of minority views becomes nothing more than a matter of 
majority grace.”
197
  While this is true of all jurors, majority verdicts may 
disproportionately exclude the views of women and minorities. 
Studies have found that men and women remember evidence and 
testimony differently, and in particular, men tend to neglect conduct in the 
context of relationships and conceptualize moral issues in a rights-
oriented—and consequently more abstract—manner.
198
  Without adequate 
discussion, therefore, different perspectives and evaluations of the evidence 
may be missed by the group as a whole.  Furthermore, in mock-jury studies, 
it has been observed that women speak less frequently during 
deliberations.
199
  When women do offer their opinions, men tend to 
interrupt them or ignore their comments.
200
  In general, women also “take 
longer than men to enter” into the discussion.
201
  The combination of these 
factors implies that when a verdict can be returned on a majority vote, 
where deliberations are shorter and more result-oriented, the viewpoints of 
women are more likely to be disregarded.  When unanimity is required, the 
viewpoints of all jurors—including women—demand a more thorough 
examination.
202
  It does little good attempting to ensure that juries are fully 
representative if the decisionmaking scheme tends to de facto exclude the 
viewpoints of women. 
There is even more evidence suggesting that jury deliberations benefit 
from the viewpoint of racial minorities.
203
  Unconscious stereotyping, which 
can automatically occur even by individuals who do not espouse any racist 
notions, will affect how an individual processes information and evidence 
shown at trial; and “jurors belonging to the stereotyped group will recall 
information differently.”
204
  Diverse juries will deliberate longer and 
 
196 Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 396 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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consider a wider range of information, and white jurors make fewer 




The most problematic findings are those that show how ethnicity 
changes perceptions of credibility and guilt.  Studies by Bodenhausen and 
Lichtenstein show that subjects who knew the accused’s ethnicity were 
more likely to find him guilty than those who had no such knowledge.
206
  In 
fact, those who knew the defendant’s ethnicity “recommended on average a 




One study examining the results from empirical data compiled on the 
effect of race on jury behavior found, simply, “anti-Black bias exerted an 
overall significant effect on the sentencing decisions of mock jurors.”
208
  
The presence of jurors who are of a different race from the accused 
increases the likelihood that conscious and unconscious biases influence 
whether or not the accused will be found guilty.
209
  Under a majority-verdict 
system, any power of minority jurors to bring to the attention of their fellow 
jurors information or evidence they may have missed, or to challenge their 




Importantly, the jury serves a critical symbolic role in the judicial 
system.  Researchers have found in several different studies that jurors who 
were required to arrive at a unanimous vote reported greater satisfaction 
from their deliberations and had more confidence in their verdicts.
211
  Those 
jurors “also rated their deliberations as more serious and thorough.”
212
  
Interestingly, both the holdouts and the prevailing members of majority-
verdict juries rated the deliberations as less thorough and their fellow jurors 
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as less open-minded than did those jurors on unanimous juries, implying 




3. Concerns About Hung Juries Are Overblown 
Furthermore, the notion that the number of hung juries would 
significantly decrease if majority verdicts were accepted is misguided.  It is 
true that hung juries in criminal cases are more likely in jurisdictions where 
unanimity is required.
214
  However, hung-jury rates are only on average 
around 6.2% of criminal trials; if a ten-to-two vote sufficed for a verdict, 
the rate would only be reduced to 3.6%.
215
  The National Center for State 
Courts study of felony juries found that in those cases in which the minority 
at the beginning of deliberations consisted of one or two jurors, only 2.9% 
ended in a hung jury.
216
  In 83% of the trials that end in a hung jury, the 
minority position was supported by at least three jurors at the beginning of 
deliberations.
217
  “Jury deadlocks predominantly reflect genuine 
disagreement over the weight of the evidence, rather than the irrationality or 
stubbornness of one or two unreasonable jurors.”
218
  There is even evidence 
that, where the judge was polled as to what he or she would have ruled had 
the trial been a bench trial, a substantial number of judges came to the same 
conclusion as the holdout jurors.
219
  This finding “suggests that the conflict 
on some of these juries posed precisely the kind of challenge to the majority 
position that a deliberative process should welcome.”
220
 
As the majority in Apodaca based the bulk of its analysis on the effect 
of unanimity on the function of the jury, it is clear that the holding has been 
dramatically undermined by subsequent empirical research.  Indeed, far 
from confirming the Justices’ assumptions that a jury would behave no 
differently in a majority-verdict rather than a unanimous-verdict trial, it has 
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since been shown that majority-verdict juries have faster, less robust 
deliberations and are likely to discount the opinions of women and 
minorities.  Furthermore, the concerns about the increase in hung juries are 
overblown.  If a decision of the Supreme Court rests upon assumptions that 
turn out to be false, the decision must necessarily be reexamined in light of 
newer, more accurate research. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Court’s stance against a two-tiered system of incorporation in 
McDonald compels a reexamination of those rights that have as yet not 
been incorporated to the states, and overturning Apodaca should be one of 
the priorities of the Court in the coming terms.  Jury unanimity is clearly 
fundamental to the Anglo-American system of justice.  Unanimous juries 
were required in the fourteenth century, and unanimity was since enshrined 
in common law as one of the irrefutable rights of an Englishman.  
Unanimity in verdicts protects the defendant from the power of the 
government, ensures the state is held to a very high standard of proof, and 
helps to build the community’s confidence in the judicial system.  The 
assumption in Apodaca that juries behave the same regardless of the 
number of votes required for a verdict has been proven dead wrong.  It has 
been shown, time and again, that jury deliberations under a majority-vote 
scheme are inferior to those under a unanimous scheme: unanimous-verdict 
juries are lengthier, more thorough, take into account more viewpoints, and 
protect the participation of women and minorities. 
The policy reasons are striking, and that is because fundamental 
fairness requires that a defendant be subject to the same criminal process 
regardless of whether the claim is brought in federal or state court.  If Mr. 
Apodaca, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Bowen, or Mr. Herrera were tried in another 
jurisdiction, it is very possible that they would have been acquitted.  But 
because—relying on nothing more than intuition—unanimity was deemed 
not an ‘essential’ right to be incorporated, the men were convicted.  
McDonald requires otherwise; the Court’s stance on the incorporation of all 
those rights that are fundamental to the American system compels a 
reexamination, and rejection, of the holding in Apodaca. 
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